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Introduction
It belies its magnitude to say the debate surrounding
international regulation of the biotechnology industry is contentious
and rife with competing interests.' It is, instead, a high-stakes game
pitting a billion dollar industry against conceivably priceless
biological diversity.2 It is the struggle to balance unknown risks
against almost limitless potential Biotechnology, a much older
I See Angela Sanchez, Environment: Debate Over Transgenics Heats Up,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 23, 1999, in 1999 WL 5947186 (quoting Colombian
President Andres Pastrana as he enumerated the competing interests in his opening
remarks to the convention and urged the international community to "responsibly
tackle issues involving biodiversity, such as global food security, health, cultural
diversity, traditional systems of production and an equitable future, in the
industrialized world and developing nations"); see also id. (explaining the debate
between developing countries and industrialized countries); see also Andrew
Pollack, U.S. Rejects Pact on Genetically Altered Goods Treaty Called ins ufficient,
Restrictive, NEw ORLEANs TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 25, 1999, atA 15 (describing the
various interests of different countries in the debate on a Biosafety Protocol).
2 See European BioNews - Special Issue, (visited Aug. 6,
1999)<http://ecom 1.netbeat.com/news-europabio/news.taf?_function=details&i
d=50> (noting that the European biotech industry alone was worth an estimated
ECU 40 billion in 1997 and predicting that the industry could be worth ECU 250
billion by 2005).
3 See Frank Bajak, Critics Claim U.S. Greed is at Root of Refusal to Sign
Biosafety Treaty, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 24, 1999, at 18A
(explaining that proponents of biotech emphasize the ability to potentially ensure
global food security, while opponents of biotech predict "a biological time bomb"
if the genetically modified products go awry); see also, Karen Graziano, Biosafety
Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of the Environment, 7 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 185 (1996) (weighing bioengineering's risks against
the perceived benefits). It is difficult to identify the potential risks associated with
genetic engineering and this difficulty is exacerbated by the speed with which
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science than many are aware,4 has become associated in modem times
with the alteration of plant and animal deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA").5 The science of biotechnology has been used to create
living modified organisms ("LMOs"), organisms which have their
genetic structure altered in an effort to remove their naturally-
occurring unfavorable characteristics or enhance genetically favored
characteristics.' Recognizing the diverse applications of this type of
technology, yet sobered by the potential to do irrevocable damage to
bioengineered products are being developed and released into the environment. See
id; see also THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NEED FOR GREATER
REGULATION AND CONTROL OF GENETIC ENGINEERING: A STATEMENT BY
SCIENTISTS CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT TRENDS IN THE NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY
11 (1994) (claiming that biotech companies produce much of the world's
bioengineered crops in Third World countries and disregard these ecosystems
making them susceptible to potentially catastrophic environmental damage); cf.
Steven W. Frank, Food Additive Models for the Regulation of Recombinant DNA
Technology Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 45 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 169, 173-79 (1990) (describing the range of potential food uses of
biotechnology).
4 See Thomas Redick, et al., Private Legal Mechanisms For Regulating the
Risks ofGenetically Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the Biosafety
Protocol, 4 ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1997) (noting that humans began modifying the
genetic structure of plants at the dawn of modem agriculture).
5 See Draft Protocol on Biosafety at Annex V, art. 3(i), U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/L.2/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter Draft Protocol] (defining
modem biotechnology as "(i) In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including
recombinant DNA and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, (ii)
fusion of cells beyond the taxanomic family, that overcome natural physiological
reproductive of recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in
traditional breeding and selection").
6 See id. art. 3(g) (defining a living modified organism as "any living
organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through
the use of modem biotechnology"). The phrase "living modified organism" is used
interchangeably with the common phrase "genetically modified organism"
("GMO"). However, the phrase LMO appears more frequently in official United
Nations documents. See id.
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the environment,7 the parties to the United Nations' Convention on
Biological Diversity ("CBD") called for consideration of the need for
a Biosafety Protocol.8
CBD member countries held meetings to determine the need
for a protocol.' They concluded that guidelines on biosafety were
7 See Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, New Crops, New Century,
New Challenges: How Will Scientists, Farmers and Consumers Learn to Love
Biotechnology And What Happens If They Don't?, Address before the National
Press Club (Jul. 13, 1999) (transcript available in the USDA Sec. 3/3) [hereinafter
Statement of Sec. Glickman] (listing numerous positive potential applications of
biotechnology). Biotechnology has been employed to reduce the use of pesticides,
reduce the acreage of land necessary to cultivate for food production, improve the
nutritional content of various foods, reduce water usage and develop more
environmentally sound methods of ink removal from pulp. See id. But see John E.
Losey, Linda S. Rayor, & Maureen E. Carter, Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch
Larvae, NATURE 214, 399 (May 19, 1999)(announcing results of a experiment
which revealed that monarch larvae raised on leaves dusted with pollen from
bioengineered corn suffered a higher mortality rate than those larvae raised on
natural corn pollen); see also Genetic Engineering: When Science Becomes a
Menace (visited Aug. 9, 1999) <http://www.newage.com.au/library/gentic.html>
(describing various instances where bioengineered products had negative
unintended consequences). In one example, the United States government
attempted to engineer a "super pig" by inserting human growth genes into the pig's
genetic code. Rather than being born far larger than normal, the pig was born bow-
legged, arthritic and cross-eyed. See id.
8 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature at United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, June 5, 1992, art. 19, para. 3,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter
Convention on Biological Diversity](calling for the parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity to examine "the need for and modalities of a protocol setting
out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement,
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organisms
resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity").
9 See Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity, U.N.
Environment Program (UNEP), 3d Sess., at 9-10, UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.5
(1990)[hereinafter Ad Hoc Working Group]; see also Graziano, supra note 3, at
196 (discussing arguments for and against a biosafety protocol). But see UNEP,
Expert Panel, Report of Panel IV, Annex V: Socio-Economic Conditions and the
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essential for the safe transfer and development ofLMOs.° Since this
determination, representatives from the biotech industry, numerous
nongovernmental organizations, and the CBD member countries have
been meeting to work on the development of a Biosafety Protocol."
These meetings were intended to culminate in a final meeting in
Cartagefia, Colombia in February 1999 for the purpose of finalizing
the Biosafety Protocol and submitting it to the first extraordinary
meeting of the Conference of Parties ("ExCOP"). 2 However, by the
final day of negotiations, a small United States-led coalition known
as the "Miami Group"'3 managed to stall any further negotiation of a
treaty.' 4  On February twenty-fourth, 1999, the President of the
Conservation of Biological Diversity, Figure 2 Explanatory Notes, at VI-6, note 11
(Apr. 28, 1993)(concluding prior to the development of the CBD, that a protocol
was unnecessary because it would be outdated before it could be agreed upon).
The UNEP panel also concluded that "[t]he targeting of biotechnology by an
international protocol stigmatizes the techniques and increases public concerns,
hence diverting resources, political attention, and delaying innovative and
beneficial developments that will help the conservation and sustainable
development of biological diversity." See id. at note 11.
10 See Ad Hoe Working Group, supra note 9.
11 See Paul E. Hagen et al., The Road From Rio: International
Environmental Issues For U.S. Business in 1997, SB79 ALI-ABA 65, 86
(describing various ongoing efforts by countries and NGOs to develop guidelines
on the safe use of modified organisms).
12 See Draft Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/l/L.2/Rev. 1 atpara. 4 (1999)
[hereinafter Draft Report on Biosafety] (noting that the first extraordinary meeting
of the Conference of the Parties was convened for the purpose of adopting a
biosafety protocol).
13 See Bill Lambrecht, Talks Collapse on Rules For Genetic Crops U.S.,
Allies BlockedlnternationalAccord, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 1999, at
Al (listing the member countries of the Miami Group - the United States,
Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay).
14 See id. (claiming that the United States and its allies were concerned that
labeling laws, and additional proposals pending before the COP would threaten
international trade in LMOs). Rafe Pomerance, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State and one of the chief United States negotiators, claimed that "the solidarity of
the Miami group was key to [the] outcome" in Cartagefia and that the Miami
1999]
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ExCOP, Mr. Laszlo Miklos, was forced to call a suspension of
discussions for the purpose of continued informal negotiation with
representatives of the Miami Group countries."5
Formal talks are scheduled to continue in May 2000, at which
point it is hoped the Parties will achieve a final agreement on a
Biosafety Protocol. 6 In anticipation of the resumed talks in May
2000 and further informal meetings to be held later this year,17 this
Comment examines the labeling issues which proved to be one source
of the deadlock"8 this past February in Cartagefia and argues that the
United States must accept the labeling provisions of the Biosafety
Protocol in order to protect the market in biotechnology. Part I of this
Comment provides a brief overview of the events leading up to the
meetings in Cartagefia and the development of a Biosafety Protocol.
Part II discusses the various proposals examined by the Biosafety
Working Group, focusing specifically on the proposed labeling
requirements and advanced informed agreement ("AIA")
group's interests were "too big... to be ignored." See id.
Is See Draft Report on Biosafety, supra note 12, para. 40-50 (recording the
decision of President Miklos and the negotiating parties to suspend the discussion
to provide for consideration of two proposals, one from the European Union and
the other from the Miami group).
16 See Pollack, supra note I (explaining that the delegates decided to
suspend the meeting and resume talks no later than May 2000).
17 See Letter from Laszlo Miklos, President of the Fourth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, to National
Focal Points (May 31, 1999)(on file with author)(acknowledging that significant
progress could be made via informal discussions of the negotiating groups prior to
the resumption of the formal talks).
is See U.S. -European Union Trade Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm. 106th Cong. 5 (1999)
(statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs U.S. Department of State) [hereinafter Statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat] (pointing out that the United States' position on labeling required the
European Union and a Biosafety Protocol to provide more specific labeling
guidelines for United States companies and that the Cartagefia talks had failed in
this regard).
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procedures.'9 Part III takes a closer look at the United States' reasons
for actively opposing the current protocol and looks at the United
States' internal regulatory and labeling system for genetically
modified goods. Part IV looks at international reaction to the outcome
of negotiations at Cartagefia and also examines the United States
response in the months following the Cartagefia talks. Finally, Part
V recommends that the United States-led Miami Group must accede
to an international standard for labeling of bioengineered products.
This Comment further suggests that United States participation in the
development of a Biosafety Protocol must be guided by a better
understanding of the global market, including the increased premium
placed on safely engineered food products.
I. Biosafety Protocol
A. Background
Article 19, paragraph 3 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity calls for an examination of the need for a protocol on
biosafety," and, in December of 1994, the Conference of the Parties
voted to establish an Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts to assess
this need and report their findings before the second meeting of the
Conference of the Parties (COP II) in November of 1995.21 The
Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts concluded that a Biosafety
Protocol was necessary for the safe and continued trade and
development of LMOs, and, on the basis of this opinion, the COP II
established an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety (the
19 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 5 (describing the application of the
advance informed agreement procedures). For the purposes of this article, AIA
procedures are those procedures which a nation may employ to control the
transboundary movements of goods across their sovereign borders. See id.
20 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 8 (defming the goal
of the Convention with regard to Biosafety).
21 See generally Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 9 (discussing the
recommendations of the Ad Hoc working Group).
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"BWG") to begin work on developing the protocol.22 The BWG was
tasked specifically with assessing the threat transboundary movement
of LMOs posed to the sustainable use of biological diversity.23
Between July 1996 and February 1999, the BWG held six different
meetings aimed at developing the final protocol.24 The sixth meeting,
held from February fourteenth through the nineteenth in Cartagefia25,
was intended to be the final meeting to work out the remaining
differences regarding a Biosafety Protocol before ultimately
submitting the protocol to the ExCOP for adoption.26 Despite the
previous five meetings, the BWG still had numerous issues
22 See id. at para. 40 (calling for the creation of a Biosafety Working Group
to begin coordination of a Draft Protocol).
2 See id
24 See Report ofthe Sixth Session ofthe Open-endedA dHoc Working Group
on Biosafety and the First Extraordinary Session of the CBD Conference of the
Parties, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.), Feb. 26,
1999, at 1-2 [hereinafter Report of the Sixth Session] (summarizing the goals and
accomplishments of the five meetings leading up to the sixth and final meeting of
the BWG in Cartagefia). The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties was
held in July 1996 to discuss preliminary issues, define key terms to be used in the
drafting of a protocol, delineate the relevant categories of LMOs resulting from
modem biotechnology and formulate the scope of advance informed agreement
procedures. The second meeting was held in May 1997 to initiate discussion of a
protocol and call for draft proposals. The third meeting was held in October 1997
and a draft text was developed to provide the basis for negotiations in future
meetings. The fourth meeting was held in February 1998 and consisted largely of
negotiating sessions. The fifth meeting was held in May 1998 and served mainly
to provide clarification on key elements of the protocol and sharpen the final issues
for debate. Id.
25 See id. at I (listing the session dates for the Sixth Session of the Open-
Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety which was followed immediately by
the first extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity held February twenty-second through the twenty-fourth).
26 See id. at 2-3 (discussing thirty articles in the draft negotiating text which
remained unresolved at the beginning of the sixth meeting of the BWG); see also
UNEP Press Release, Governments PostponeAdoption ofBiosafety Treaty, (visited
Aug. 6, 1999) <http:/Iwww.biodiv.org/press/pr2-99-BSWG6.html> (explaining that
any protocol ultimately approved by the countries will form a binding protocol
under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity).
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remaining.27 On February twenty-fourth 1999, the President of the
ExCOP, Mr. Juan Mayr Maldonado, announced that the BWG had
failed to reach a consensus on a Biosafety Protocol.2" In lieu of a
final protocol, the negotiating parties submitted two different
proposals, one on behalf of the European Union and one on behalf of
the Miami Group.29 The President subsequently suspended the
ExCOP and called for the meeting to be resumed at a later date."
The structure and language of the labeling provisions under
the proposed Biosafety Protocol proved to be one of the biggest
stumbling blocks in negotiations between the European Union
countries and the Miami Group." Therefore, to understand the legal
arguments that form the debate over labeling issues, it is important to
first understand the goals, the structure and formative history of the
Draft Biosafety Protocol.
27 See Report of the Sixth Session, supra note 24, at 15 (explaining the
creation the "Group of Ten" established by ExCOP President Mayr in an effort to
reach consensus on the remaining issues of the BWG). The group revisited the
remaining outstanding issues, as identified by the various negotiating groups, but
reached no consensus. See id.
28 See id.
29 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, Annex II and Annex III (detailing the
respective proposals submitted by the European Union and the Miami group).
30 See Draft Report on Biosafety, supra note 12, para. 55 (calling for an
official suspension of the meetings in Cartagefia and stating that talks should
resume no later than the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties scheduled
to be held in Nairobi in May 2000).
31 See Highlights From BSWG-6 Monday, 15 February 1999, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.), Feb. 16, 1999, at 2
[hereinafter Highlights From BSWG-6](describing the debate during the meeting
of the BWG regarding labeling and detailing the numerous varying proposals
submitted for the consideration of the committee); see also Padmaja Padman,
Crossing Swords Over Transgenic Foods, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at
A7 (explaining that talks ended with a compromise text because the United States
and its allies were adamantly opposed to "full disclosure of information, including
the name and address of companies in some cases, to the public").
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B. Goals and Structure of a Draft Biosafety Protocol
The first article of the Draft Protocol delineates the agreed
upon objective of a Biosafety Protocol - the protection of biological
diversity3 2 through "adequate" regulation of transfer, handling and use
of bioengineered products.33 The language in Article 1 indicates an
intent to provide only a basic regulatory structure for safe trade in
LMOs,34 and further provisions of the Draft Protocol emphasize the
sovereign right of member nations to implement stricter regulatory
requirements.35 Any agreed upon Protocol will therefore represent the
lowest regulatory threshold for biosafety, while leaving stricter
32 See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely
Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555, 570 (1995) (defining biological diversity as
"the full range of variability among living organisms and the natural communities
in which they occur" and explaining that this definition is derived from legislation
proposed by the United States Congress but never passed). Biological diversity is
also perceived as having four hierarchical levels which include: regional ecosystem
diversity; local ecosystem diversity; species diversity; and genetic diversity. See id.
at 570.
33 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 1 (stating that the objective of a
protocol "is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field
of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from
modem biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human
health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements.")(emphasis added).
34 See id (defining the objectives of the Draft Protocol).
35 See, e.g., id. at art. 4 (discussing the scope of the protocol and noting that,
although the draft protocol is not intended to apply to those LMOs intended to be
used for pharmaceuticals, the Protocol does not affect "the right of the Parties to
subject all living modified organisms to risk assessment prior to the making of
decisions on import")(emphasis added). But see Susan H. Bragdon, National
Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility: Can the Tension Be
Reconciledfor the Conservation ofBiologicalDiversity?, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 381,
391 (1992) (admitting that sovereign rule is compromised by concessions to global
treaties which protect the resources of a particular country disproportionately).
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requirements to the discretion of individual nations.36 As a result, the
United States-led Miami Group's failure to agree upon a minimum
set of standards at Cartagefia creates a troubling perception that the
United States and its allies are only content with meaningless controls
and an impotent, ineffectual Biosafety Protocol.37
The Draft Protocol goes on to delineate the application of an
advance informed agreement ("AIA') procedure for transboundary
movements of LMOs.3  The AIA procedures, combined with the
labeling requirements of Article 15, form the core strength of the
Biosafety Protocol.39 Far from inflexible, these guidelines allow for
changes in scientific knowledge and provide a method by which a
country of import may change or revoke a previous decision
regarding aparticularLMO." Remaining articles are less substantive,
36 See Ellen Hey, Increasing Accountability for the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity: An Issue of Transnational Global Character, 6
COLO. J. INTL. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 23 (1995) (advocating a strict regulation of
sustainable development activities under the Convention on Biological Diversity
but conceding that negotiating concessions would probably make that an
impossibility).
37 See, e.g., Brian Halweil, US. Derails Biosafey Protocol, 12 WORLD
WATCH 3 (May 1999)(claiming that the United States derailed the negotiations at
Cartagefla by rejecting an already "watered-down proposal" because they felt it
would inhibit the growth of the biotechnology industry).
38 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 29 (discussing the
application ofthe advance informed agreement procedure). Under this application,
exporters of LMOs are required to notify, in writing, an importing country when
they intend to ship a LMO to a point within the importing country. The country of
import must then acknowledge receipt of the notification and decide whether to
allow the import of the LMO to proceed or prohibit importation. See id.
39 See id., art. 15 (requiring LMOs falling under the purview of the Protocol
to be clearly identified and calling for further consideration of the identification
and packaging standards).
40 See, e.g., id., art. 9 (stating that a party may "in light of new scientific
information . . . review and change its decisions regarding intentional
transboundary movements").
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more procedural and serve to provide a strong regulatory framework
which countries may rely upon to protect their biodiversity interests.4'
Article 15 regarding the handling, transport, packaging and
identification of LMOs, proved to be an extremely divisive issue at
Cartagefia, and continues to feature prominently in trade talks which
have ensued in the months since the Cartagehia discussions.42
C. Labeling Under the Biosafety Protocol
Article 15 enumerates the procedures for handling, transport,
packaging and identification of LMOs subject to the scope of the
protocol.43 This article requires transported LMOs to be accompanied
by documentation including information such as traits and
characteristics of the organism, instructions for safe handling and
transport of the organism, a contact point for obtaining further
information, and a declaration that the transboundary movement is
being conducted in compliance with the requirements of the
Protocol." There is no explicit mention of "labeling" within the
41 See id., arts. 16-39 (providing for the ratification of the treaty, creation of
a biosafety clearing-house, treatment of non-parties to the convention, public
awareness efforts, financing of future conferences, etc.); see also S. Gopikrishna
Warder, Biodiversity Legislation Derailed, BUSINESs LINE, May 20, 1999 at 2
(explaining that a Biosafety Protocol also serves the useful purpose of providing
developing countries, lacking in expertise or legislation, with a framework to
regulate the spread of GMOs).
42 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the various
European Union Directives which have been initiated in the months subsequent to
the talks in CartagefIa); see also U.S. Asks WHO To Put Food Safety On The Table
For 2000, CONGRESSDAILY (National Journal), Aug. 12, 1999 at 3 (stating that the
growing sensitivity over food safety has prompted the United States to ask the
World Health Organization to add food safety issues to its agenda for the executive
board meeting to be held in January 2000).
43 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 15 (delineating the rules for safe
handling, packaging and transport of bioengineered products under the Protocol).
4 See id., art. 15 (b)(i)-(iv) (describing various documentation requirements
such as storage and transport requirements and name and address of importer and
exporter).
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Draft Protocol, and the use of this terminology in itself was a
stumbling block for the United States and its allies.4 However, it is
understood that Article 15 contains the guidelines that companies
must comply with in identifying their product as an LMO. 46 Parties
were aware of the discord that explicit labeling requirements would
provoke, and, in an effort to circumvent the issues of labeling, the
Protocol leaves development of further labeling and transport
standards open for future meetings.47
The Protocol however, does require the Parties to conduct
public outreach efforts in their countries to encourage public
awareness of safe-handling and use of LMOs.4" These goals are
45 See Highlights From BSWG-6, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining that the
term "Labeling" was bracketed in the title of Article 15 and thus had not been
officially included as part of Article 15). The highlights of the debate from
February sixteenth go on to explain that delegates remain undecided as to whether
LMO products should be accompanied by documentation, be physically labeled as
a GMO or some combination of both labeling and documentation. See id.
46 See generally id. (noting that labeling issues are almost exclusively
discussed within the debate surrounding Article 15). According to the report,
working group "discussions centered on labeling/identification, relevant
international rules and standards, and development of new standards under the
Protocol." See id. Most developing countries supported a mandatory provision on
handling, transport, packaging and labeling. However, some supported a clearly
defined label on the package or the container in addition to accompanying
documentation. See id. One delegation, it was noted, requested that workers
handling the LMOs be made aware of proper storage and risks associated with
handling LMOs. See id. Surprisingly, many developed countries preferred to
exclude labeling from Article 15, citing sufficiency of identification. See id.
Numerous countries did not support documentation requirements, claiming that
these requirements, like labeling for consumers, are a domestic policy matter. See
id.
47 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 15(2) (stating that the Parties "shall
consider the need for and modalities of developing standards with regard to
identification, handling, packaging and transport practices, taking into
consideration the results of consultations with other international bodies").
48 See id. at art. 20(1) (stating that the Parties shall "promote and facilitate
public awareness, education and participation concerning safety in transfer,
handling and use of living modified organisms in relation to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human
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accomplished primarily through public awareness of and access to a
"Biosafety Clearing-House" and public consultation in the
decisionmaking process regarding LMOs.49 The emphasis on public
outreach reflects international understanding of the need for better
public awareness of genetic modification; although the side-effects of
LMOs are unknown, public awareness requirements place some
control in the hands of the individual." The United States has not
advertised domestic LMO content in its food products, but
international initiatives such as the Biosafety Protocol are slowly
triggering American awareness of these safe handling and labeling
issues."
Treatment and application of the Protocol's regulations by
those countries who are not parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity is addressed within the Protocol and essentially requires
those countries wishing to deal with member countries to comply
with the requirements, including the labeling requirements, of the
health").
49 See id. at art. 20(2) (requiring the Parties to "consult the public in the
decision-making process regarding living modified organisms"). Also Article 17
provides:
(1) A Biosafety Clearing-House is hereby established
as part of the clearing-house mechanism under Article 18,
paragraph 3, of the Convention, in order to:
(a) Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical,
environmental and legal information on, and experience with,
living modified organisms;
(b) Assist Parties to implement the Protocol, taking into
account the special needs of developing countries, in particular
the least developed countries and small island developing States
among them, and countries with economies in transition as well
as countries that are centres of origin.
Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 17.
50 See id.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 108-10 (discussing recent efforts by
citizens groups to force the FDA to begin labeling of LMO products).
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Protocol. 2 Any shipment failing to comply with the terms of the
Protocol is deemed illegal.53 As a result, the United States biotech
industry stands to be greatly affected by any resulting Biosafety
Protocol regardless of the United States' status as non-party to the
CBD.5
4
H. The Counter Proposals
Many of the key articles discussed in Part I of this Comment
provoked heated debate and resulted in the lack of consensus at
Cartagefia 5 The stalemate prompted the introduction of three
competing proposals, one from the Miami-group, one from the
European Union and one from a group calling themselves the "like-
minded" countries.56 By examining the differences between the
Miami-group proposal and the European Union proposal it is easy to
discover the heart of the labeling controversy that contributed to the
stalemate at Cartagefia 7
52 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 21 (regulating the treatment of non-
parties to the CBD and stating that such treatment should "be consistent with the
objective and principles of [the Biosafety] Protocol").
53 See id at arts. 23-25 (discussing the penalties for noncompliance with the
Biosafety Protocol). In addition to these penalties, the Protocol calls for the
Conference of the Parties to adopt, at its first meeting, a set of international
guidelines forthe establishment of liability and the calculation ofdamages resulting
from unintentional transboundary movement of LMOs. The liability concerns
surrounding the importlexport ofLMOs are contentious in their own right and have
triggered intense debate. These issues are, however, beyond the scope of this
article. Id.
54 See infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the status of United
States ratification of the Convention on Biodiversity).
55 See generallysupranote 24 (summarizing the remaining points contention
with regard to development of a Biosafety Protocol and explaining the various
positions of the member countries).
56 See id at paras. 40-44 (listing the three reports presented by the European
Union, the Miami group and the group of like-minded countries).
37 See generally supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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A. The European Union Labeling Proposal
The proposal offered by the European Union ("EU proposal"),
like the proposal offered by the Miami Group, is set forth as a series
of amendments to the Draft Biosafety Protocol. 8 With regard to
labeling, the EU proposal would require that LMOs intended for use
as "food, feed or processing [be] clearly indicated as living modified
organisms," be accompanied by documentation listing the relevant
LMO involved and list a contact point where further information may
be obtained.59
The Draft Protocol does not make a special distinction for
those LMOs intended for use as "food, feed or processing," and it
does not require labeling on the product itself as the EU Proposal
would appear to do.6" These amendments offered by the European
Union are reflective of legislative initiatives pending before the
legislative bodies of various European Union countries and the
European Commission which would make LMO-derived food
products more easily identifiable for consumers.6 Such initiatives are
a result of consumer lobbying efforts and general public demand for
58 See Package Proposal on the Text of the Draft Protocol: Submission By
the European Union, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/L.2/Rev.1 at annex II
[hereinafter EU Proposal](describing European Union proposed amendments to the
current Draft Biosafety Protocol).
59 See id. at para. 2(2)(c)(regulating the labeling of LMOs intended for
consumption).
60 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, annex V, art. 15 (requiring the
identification of only those LMOs "subject to international transboundary
movement within the scope of the protocol"); see also Ways and Means to Promote
and Facilitate Access to, and Transfer and Development of, Technology, Including
Biotechnology, UNEP Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological
Advice, 2d Mtg., Item 3, para. 59-66, U.N. Doc UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/2/6 (1996)
(visitedAug. 1, 1999) <http://www.biodiv.org/sbstta2/sb206.html> (pioneering the
creation of a biological database maintaining consumer information regarding the
content and manufacturing process of LMOs).
61 See, e.g. infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (describing a United
Kingdom directive which has been agreed upon and will require labeling of all
GMO products containing a threshold level of genetically modified product).
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labeling of genetically modified products.62 Regardless of their merit
or necessity in the regulation of genetically altered goods, these
initiatives signify the concerns of the people who make up the
consumer base for the biotechnology industry.63 The United States,
ignoring this market reality, took a decidedly different approach with
its proposal.
B. The Miami Group Labeling Proposal
While the EU Proposal would broaden the scope of a
Biosafety Protocol, the Miami Group Proposal seeks to narrow the
application of the labeling requirements.' Specifically, the Miami
Group Proposal would have Article 15 apply only to those LMOs
which are within the "scope of the AIA procedure" rather than the
broader category of LMOs regulated by the Protocol in general.65
In addition, the Miami Group Proposal would modify Article
4 of the Draft Protocol regarding the scope of a Biosafety Protocol.66
The Draft Protocol currently exempts certain types of LMOs from
62 See Links to Genetic Campaigns, Educational information, & other
associated sites, (visited on Aug. 9, 1999)
<http://www.essential-trading.co.uklgfalinks.htm> (listing various international
grassroots campaigns organized to promote labeling of genetically modified
goods); see also Biosafety Protocol Fails to Pass Muster in Colombia, 10
BIOWORLD TODAY 46, May 12, 1999 (noting that the European Union vote on
the Biosafety Protocol was an attempt to gain political cache with their constituents
back home).
63 See infra note 122 and accompanying text (describing the general feeling
that biotech companies hope to gain from the public's ignorance).
64 See Outstanding Issues and Necessary Revisions to the Text of the Draft
Protocol: Submission by the Miami Group, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/L.2/Rev. 1, at Annex III [hereinafter Miami Group Proposal]
(representing the package of amendments offered by the United States and its
allies).
65 See id. at para. 2(a) (substituting "scope ofthe AIA procedure" for "scope
of the Protocol").
6 See Draft Protocol, supra note 5, art. 4 (defining the scope of the draft
protocol on biosafety).
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regulation under a Biosafety Protocol.67 However, Article 4(2)(b) of
the Draft Protocol does not exempt LMOs subject to transit from the
rules applicable under Article 15 .6 The Miami Group Proposal seeks
to remove the reference to Article 15 in Article 4, effectively creating
an exemption from handling and documentation rules of Article 15
for LMOs in transit.
69
Each of these proposals are offshoots of the Miami Group's
concern for unrestricted trade and the desire to save the biotech
industry from cumbersome and costly labeling and documentation
requirements.7" The position of the Miami Group is that it is better
to have no Protocol than the current Protocol, but this view is short
sighted in light of the powerful role which the United States plays in
the biotechnology industry and the role it assumed at the Cartagefia
talks.71 The desire to avoid the creation of a Biosafety Protocol hurts
the United States' reputation in the biotechnology market and creates
a negative perception among future consumers of United States
biotech products.'
67 See, e.g. id. (exempting those LMOs that are not likely to have adverse
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity).
698 See id. at art. 4(2)(b) (stating that the Protocol will not apply to "[tiransit
of living modified organisms, except as regards Articles 2, 14 and 15").
69 See Miami Group Proposal, supra note 64, para. 2(b) (proposing that the
Parties "[iun article 4, subparagraph 2(b), delete the reference to article 15
connected with transit").
70 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 7 (explaining that
"certain proposals would have created disguised barriers to trade... would have
led to unnecessary trade restrictions on the world's food supply and limited the
ability of other nations to enjoy the benefits of modem biotechnology").
71 See Frank Bajak, International Treaty Talks on Gene Technology
Collapse, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 1999, at A7 (quoting Rafe Pomerance,
deputy chief of the United States delegation, as saying that "[n]o deal was better
than a bad deal, and that was the outcome" in Cartagefla).
72 See Financial Digest, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 24, 1999, at El
(reprinting the statement by French Minister of Agriculture, Jean Glavany, that
"American's have the worst food in the world").
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1. The United States' Role
The United States is a well-known leader in the biotechnology
industry.73 United States companies produce $50 billion annually in
agricultural exports, and it is expected that over the next few years,
one hundred percent of United States agricultural exports will be
either genetically modified or mixed with genetically modified
products.74 Consequently, the United States has a significant
incentive to protect the unrestricted trade in genetically modified
products. The blind march toward unregulated trade, however, has
hurt the United States' credibility in its dealings with the international
community.75 The seemingly intractable position of the Miami Group
at Cartagefia angered many of the member countries who viewed the
United States-led opposition as an effort to create a "biotrade"
protocol rather than a "biosafety" protocol.76
Further resentment was fueled by the perception that the
United States was actively working behind the scenes to derail
negotiations." This perception was aided by the fact that the United
73 See Bill Lambrecht, Compromise is Proposed for Pact on Genetically
Altered Products New Rules Could Exempt Some Farm Commodities, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 1999, at A5 (noting that Monsanto Co., an American
company, is the world leader in genetic technologies).
74 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the
steady growth of trade in bioengineered products).
75 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
76 See Brian Halweil, supra note 37 (stating that Sateeaved Seebaluck, a
delegate from Mauritius, complained that the final result of the Biosafety Protocol
to preserve biodiversity resembled more of a "biotrade" protocol); see also, Angela
Sanchez, Environment: New Delay For Biosafety Protocol, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Feb. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5947236 (quoting attorney Chee Yoke, saying
that "[flrom the start, the biotechnology industry, protected by the United States
and other industrialized countries, demonstrated what was confirmed here: the
Miami Group never wanted a Biosafety Protocol, but rather a free trade treaty").
77 See Sanchez, supra note 1 (describing tactics employed by the United
States which were perceived as efforts to derail the negotiations). Delegates felt
that United States efforts to break up discussions into a large number of groups and
sub-groups was an attempt to dilute support for various proposals. Delegates were
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States participated in the Cartagefiatalks as an official United Nations
observer.7" Although the United States has taken steps to become a
signatory to the Convention on Biodiversity, the United States
Congress has failed to ratify the Convention.79 Numerous member
countries concluded that the United States would rather employ
subversive tactics to derail negotiations than negotiate a compromise
agreement.8 0
The United States' position with regard to labeling at the
Cartagefia convention was buttressed by the belief that current United
States standards for regulating the release of LMOs are sufficient and
should serve as a model for other countries looking to develop their
own biotech regulatory system.8' It is useful therefore to examine the
internal regulatory system which the United States employs for
regulation of its own biotech industry.
also angered by the exclusive use of English in the texts under negotiation. See id.
78 See id. (quoting Greenpeace International's Liza Covantes saying that
"history repeats itself, as occurred seven years ago at the Earth Summit, the United
States, despite being the only non-signatory to the accords and thus not officially
part of the negotiation, has once again imposed its interests").
79 See Redick, supra note 4, at 17 (discussing the failure of the United States
to ratify the CBD and explaining that, as an "observer" the United States still plays
an important role in the development of a biosafety protocol); see also Report of
the First Meeting of the Conference ofthe Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Item 2, para. 15, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/7 (1995), available in,
<http://www.biodiv.org/copl/cbdrepi.html> (visited Aug. 1, 1999) (listing all
member countries to the CBD); see also Bill Lambrecht, Compromise is Proposed
for Pact on Genetically Altered Products New Rules Could Exempt Some Farm
Commodities, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 1999, at A5 (explaining that
despite efforts by the Clinton administration, the Republican-controlled Senate has
actively blocked approval of the CBD).
8o See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
S See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 4 (contrasting the
"rigorous examination process" which the United States employs to ensure the
safety of its food products with the "EU's weak decision-making machinery in [the
biotechnology industry]").
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I1. Policy Regarding The Labeling of Genetically Modified
Organisms
A. National Requirements for Regulating Genetically Modified
Goods Within the United States
Currently within the United States, labeling regulation
authority of food products rests with the Food and Drug
Administration. 2 Foods developed via bioengineering must only be
labeled if they "differ significantly" from their conventional
counterparts.8 3 The United States policymakers insist that this is
adequate to ensure the safety of the American consumer because
LMO products still go through the same "rigorous examination
process" for safety that all food and feed products go through. 4 This
examination takes place under the "Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology" which was articulated in 1986.5
82 See USDA and Biotechnology Q & A (visited Aug. 6, 1999)
<http://www.usda.gov/news/bioqa.htm> (answering the question "Are products
derived from biotechnology required to be labeled?"); see also Food and Drug
Administration, Food Labeling: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 58 Fed.
Reg. 25, 837 (1993) (detailing the United States' most comprehensive national
labeling system in regard to food products).
83 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Statement of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, supra note 18 at 25 (explaining that under the current United States
regulatory framework for labeling of GMOs and GMO products, genetically
modified high-oleic canola would have to be labeled in the United States only
because it has an oil content higher than conventional canola oil, not because it is
a product of genetic modification).
84 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18 and accompanying
text; butseeLYNNE. MURRY, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: SAFETYISSUES 113
(Karl-Heinz Engel et al. eds., American Chemical Society Series 605, 1995)
(claiming that key safety requirements are necessary for the safe consumption of
GMOs and casting doubt on the current labeling requirements in the United States).
85 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed.
Reg. 23,302 (Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y 1986) (announcement of policy)
(describing "the comprehensive federal regulatory policy for ensuring the safety of
biotechnology research and products").
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Under this approach, biotechnology products are regulated using
existing statutes and a patchwork oversight system involving three
federal agencies."
The agencies primarily responsible for regulating
biotechnology in the United States are the United States Department
of Agriculture ("USDA"), Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 7
Products are regulated according to their intended use, with some
products being regulated under more than one agency. 8 Prior to
commercialization, genetically engineered organisms must conform
with standards set by State and Federal marketing statutes.8 9
Since 1994, twenty genetically modified agricultural products
have moved successfully through the United States regulatory system
and begun the commercialization and marketing phases of their
development.90 United States policymakers credit the transparency
86 See id. (explaining that the agencies should "seek to operate their
programs in an integrated and coordinated fashion and together should cover the
full range of plants, animals and microorganisms derived by the new genetic
engineering techniques").
87 See United States: Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology (visited Aug.
9, 1999) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm> (explaining the
oversight process and providing examples of the breakdown of Agency
responsibility with regard to specific genetically modified goods).
8 See id.
9 See id. (providing examples of the various statutes which must be
complied with).
90 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 22 (touting the
successes of the United States regulatory framework for the biotechnology industry
and expressing the hope that the international community would join the United
States in creating a system of oversight which is both transparent and predictable);
see also 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b); cf APHIS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., USER'S GUIDE FOR
INTRODUCING GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND MICROORGANISMS, Tech.
Bull. No. 1783, § VI (rev. 1997) (describing, generally, the procedures for the
release and transfer of genetically modified crops into the environment).
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and predictability of the United States regulatory process with the
general consumer acceptance which genetically modified products
seem to enjoy in the United States markets."
B. International Labeling Requirements for Genetically
Modified Goods
The United States, in contrast, likes to portray the European
market as one governed by fear and characterized by unpredictable
rules based on political whim rather than scientific research.92
Regardless of the merits of this argument, international response to
the labeling issue has been more expedient and substantive than the
United States response.93 For example, in the United Kingdom, the
91 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 22 (claiming that
the "transparency and predictability of [the] process" can be credited with
encouraging consumer acceptance). But see DRAFrUNITED STATES COMMENTS TO
THE PROPOSED DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE LABELING OF FOODS OBTAINED
THROUGH BIOTECHNOLOGY, at 3-4 (Proposed Draft Amendment to the General
Standard for the Labeling of Prepackaged Foods, at Step 3 of the procedure app.
VI, P60) (Oct. 10, 1997) (stating that the United States has found it unnecessary
to regulate LMOs as a class because there is no scientific evidence to support a
conclusion that LMOs are inherently unsafe). Regardless of statements by the
USDA and the Clinton Administration, FDA has maintained their position that
special labeling for LMO products would be inappropriate, and the FDA has yet
to hold a public information hearing, originally announced in 1993, on labeling
issues for newly engineered food varieties. See 58 Fed. Reg. 25, 837 (Apr. 28,
1993).
92 See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 22 (claiming that
the European public is "susceptible to ill-informed scare tactics" because there is
"no scientifically based governmental system to approve GMO products"). United
States policynakers refer to clearly defined rules and regulations which arejudged
in a predictable fashion as transparency. United States characterization of
European regulatory controls as non-transparent is a reference to European
regulation on a case-by-case basis. See id.
93 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (describing the required
labeling practices of genetically modified food and feed products in the United
Kingdom).
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novel foods regulations governing the release of genetically modified
goods maintain the need to label genetically modified foods.94
Although genetically modified soybean and maize crops were
approved for food use before the novel foods regulations came into
force, the government quickly enacted Regulation 1813/97 which
applies the labeling provisions in the novel foods regulation to soya
and maize." Furthermore, detailed rules for labeling these products
were agreed to in a deal brokered under the U.K. Presidency, and will
94 See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BIOGUIDE: REGULATIONS,
INFORMATION AND SUPPORT FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE UK available in
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/public/frame4.html> (visited Aug. 8. 1999) [hereinafter
BIOGUIDE] (explaining that GMOs must be labeled as such if "(1)[a]ny
characteristic or food property renders a novel food or food ingredient no longer
substantially equivalent to an existing food or food ingredient, (2) the presence in
the novel food or food ingredient of material which is not present in an existing
equivalent foodstuff may have implications for the health of certain sections of the
population, or (3) the presence in the novel food or food ingredient of material
which is not present in an existing equivalent foodstuff gives rise to ethical
concerns"); see also EU/US Perspectives on Labeling Genetically Engineered
Foods, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Special Report, at 21 (describing the key differences
between United States and European Union labeling policies).
95 See BIOGUIDE, supra note 94, at 30 (describing the regulatory controls in
the United Kingdom for the regulation of biotechnology). Under the U.K. labeling
requirements, labeling is compulsory if it can be scientifically proven that the
characteristics of novel food differ from those of a chemical food or ingredient. See
id. According to new proposed regulations, labels are to be one of three types: (1)
if it is certain that food contains genetically modified DNA or genetically modified
proteins, then the label must read "product based on genetically modified soya or
maize," (2) if there is uncertainty as to whether substances in food originate from
genetically modified maize or soya, then the label must read "this product may have
been produced from modified maize or soya," (3) if it is certain that there are no
GMOs in food, then a label stating so may be used. See id.; see also Judith E.
Beach, No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Plants, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 181, 187 (describing the issuance of the
novel food regulations and their treatment of soya and maize products which form
the majority of United States exports to the European Union markets).
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require the labeling of all products which contain protein or DNA
resulting from the genetic modification, where these exceed a
threshold level.96
Other countries have developed entirely different labeling
laws from either the U.K. or U.S. systems, and one of the chief aims
of the Biosafety Protocol was a harmonization of these regulatory
standards.97 Failing in this goal, countries have been left to establish
their own regulatory standards which have included moratoriums on
import and export of all LMOs in some countries.98 While this
reaction was anticipated, it could have been avoided if the United
States had adopted a more conciliatory position with regard to the
labeling provisions of the Cartagefia Protocol.99 Instead, countries
have been left with the impression that the United States and its
96 See BIOGUIDE, supra note 94, at 30 (explaining the recent enactment of
a new directive which requires stricter labeling requirements). However, the
proposed regulations point out that requiring that products be labeled raises the
question of how to deal with cases where a GMO is present in trace amounts, or
impurities, in anon-GMO product, or where similar GMO and non-GMO products
are mixed together, as occurs with commodities. One possibility is the
establishment of amechanism to determine thresholds for specific classes of GMO
products or individual GMOs rather than to fix a single cut-off point for labeling.
See id.
97 See Padman, supra note 31 (explaining that global biotechnology giants
were welcoming the push for harmonized regulatory approvals which would
enhance the business development ofGMOs); see also South Africa's White Paper
on Biological Diversity, A BIODIVERSITY POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR SOUTH
AFRICA, Ch.3, 1.7 (discussing South Africa's policy on genetically modified
organisms and describing newly proposed legislation to create and support national
training and capacity-building programs in risk assessment and risk management
for the safe transfer, handling, use and release of genetically modified organisms).
98 See Biosafety Protocol's Failure May Sour Trade, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb.
26, 1999, at C12 (claiming that European Union officials feared that the failure of
talks in Cartagefla would strengthen those in Europe who advocated a total ban on
GMOs). Officials called the outcome "disastrous" and said it was likely to be
"spun" as a case of American sabotage. See id.
99 See Padman, supra note 31 (noting that many delegates felt that without
a protocol, a moratorium on the commercialization of LMO crops was the safest
route for countries to take).
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biotech companies intend to continue shipping their genetically
modified goods across their borders disguised as conventional food
products.' 0
IV. Reaction to The Cartagefia Negotiations
A. International Trade Conditions in the Wake of the Failed
Negotiations
Since the halt in negotiations at Cartagefia, the European
backlash to United States opposition to the proposed Biosafety
Protocol has been considerable.'0 ' Many predicted the imposition of
across-the-board moratoriums on the import of LMOs, and, in fact,
numerous countries implemented bans on trade in genetically
modified goods. 2 In May, France began to require segregation of
10 See id. (discussing the broader implications of corporate domination of the
biotechnology industry and noting that the five major bioengineering companies
seem to be moving rapidly toward commercialization of their products while the
world remains unable to keep pace with any comprehensive regulatory system).
101 See Lambrecht, supra note 13 (describing the European Commission's
recent rejection of Monsanto's application to grow genetically engineered cotton);
see also Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7 (stating that "distrust [of LMOs]
is scientifically unfounded. It comes in part from the lack of faith in the EU to
assure the safety of their food. They have no independent regulatory agencies..
. [tlhey've had many food scares in recent years... that have contributed to a
wariness of any food that is not produced in a traditional manner notwithstanding
what the science says").
102 See Report on the Sixth Session, supra note 24, at 12 (noting that
Denmark has called for a one-year moratorium on genetically-modified crops and
generally describing protests in various countries against genetically modified
goods); see also Simon Coss, EU: Ministers Debate EU-wide Moratorium on GM
Crops, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1998, at 5 (discussing the debate over a
moratorium that took place in the European Union just prior to the talks in
Cartagefla). EU governments were acutely aware of public concerns about food
safety in the wake of the 'mad cow' crisis and ministers expressed a desire to err on
the side of extreme caution more than they would have three years ago. See id. A
European Union group called BEUC has argued strongly, since the beginning of
last year, that shoppers should have the right to choose whether to buy GMO
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bioengineered and natural grains, a requirement which has imposed
significant hardship on American farmers.' °3
With regard to labeling, a European Union directive passed
earlier this year will require the introduction of a labeling system for
labeling of all foods containing LMOs.' °4 This proposed system is
due out by September 1999 and will ultimately regulate the labeling
of all food products within the E.U. system."5 Reactions such as this
emphasize the steady movement toward international labeling
requirements, and the United States failure to participate in this
movement adds to the mistrust surrounding United States
manufactured LMOs.'06
produce or not, and it claims the Union's current rules for labeling foods that
contain GMOs are unclear and misleading. See id.
103 See Tim Todd, World Ag Forum: Industry Looks For Answers to EU
GMO Issue, MONEYCENTER, May 24, 1999, at B 1 (noting the inability of most
grain processing mechanisms to segregate genetically modified grain products from
those products which are free from genetic modification); see also Marian Burros,
U.S. Plans Long- Term Studies on Safety ofGenetically AlteredFoods, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 14, 1999, at A16 (pointing out that European bans on genetically modified
grains have damaged the corn export industry, costing American farmers about
$200 million per year); see also Anne Cook, Tribune Business News, THE NEWS-
GAZETTE, May 23, 1999 at B3 (describing the procedures for processing corn in
the United States and explaining why segregation causes problems in modem grain
elevators); see also A. Novotny, EU Directive on Labeling Genetically Modified
Organisms Creates Confusion for U.S. Industry, Government, FOOD LABELING &
NUTRITIoN NEWS, July 10, 1997, at 3-4 (discussing segregation and claiming that
in addition to being unnecessary, segregation is commercially impossible for the
United States agriculture industry).
104 See James Walsh, Alien Seed?, 152 TIME MAGAZINE INT'L 8 (Aug.
1999)(stating that by September, the European Union is supposed to introduce a
scheme for advising the general public as to whether and to what extent GMOs
figure in food products).
105 See id. and accompanying text.
106 See Walsh, supra note 104 (discussing the disdain in European markets
for American-produced food products).
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B. The United States Response
Some have labeled the measures taken by the European
community as reactionary, irrational and lacking in scientific basis." 7
However, American consumers have begun to question the safety of
LMO products as well.' Recently, more than 500,000 people signed
a petition requesting the FDA to begin mandatory labeling of
genetically modified foods.0 9 The Center for Food Safety, a
nonprofit group, has also filed suit against the FDA to take the
necessary steps to reclassify gene modification as an additive so that
it would require labeling." 0  In a recent speech, United States
Department of Agriculture Secretary, Dan Glickman, conceded that
the ill-effects of bioengineering are yet unknown, and, as a safeguard,
urged policymakers to keep pace with the technology."' It is
apparent that the backlash against United States LMO exports has
caused the United States to rethink its current policy regarding the
biotech industry. 11
2
107 See Padman, supra note 31 (quoting an impromptu outburst by United
States Department of Agriculture Official Dr. S. Shantaram saying that the debate
over biosafety was being conducted by "ignoramuses, technology activists, fear-
mongers, scientists, non-scientists and pseudo-scientists"); see also supra note 87
and accompanying text.
108 See Burros, supra note 103 (discussing the fact that Americans, until
recently, have been relatively accepting of genetically modified products, but
heightened disputes with other nations at Cartagefla have provoked Americans to
start up activist labeling campaigns).
109 See id.
110 See id. (noting also that the FDA does not require testing of genetically
modified products); see also Greenpeace, et. al. v. Browner, U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist.
of Columbia (filed Feb. 18, 1999) (filing suit against the EPA for violations of
national environmental laws for allowing genetically engineered corn onto the
market).
ill See Statement of See. Glickman, supra note 7 (discussing the new
principles which will guide the regulation of the biotechnology industry).
112 See Anita Manning, Altered Food Might Mutate Trade, USA TODAY, Jul.
14, 1999, at A7 (pointing out that Secretary Glickman's comments represent a
change for the Clinton Administration, but noting that volunteer labeling
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In the Secretary's speech before the National Press Club, he
announced five principles which will guide the United States in its
development and regulation of the biotech industry." 3 Notably, he
addressed the need for voluntary labeling and conceded that there
must be "a role for information labeling.""' 4 However, it is not
enough to ask companies to begin voluntarily labeling their LMO
products.' 15 Clearly defined labeling guidelines must be established,
and the United States government needs to take a more aggressive
role in that process." 6 The statements of Secretary Glickman mark
a shift in United States trade policy, one which should also be
translated into an acceptance of stronger labeling requirements under
the Biosafety Protocol." 7
requirements fall short of the guarantees which consumer advocacy groups had
been pushing for).
13 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7 (delineating five principles
which should guide the United States approach to biotechnology in the 21st
century). The principles announced are: (1) An Ann's Length Regulatory Process,
(2) Consumer Acceptance, (3) Fairness to Farmers, (4) Corporate Citizenship, and
(5) Free and Open Trade). Id.
114 See id. at 4 (explaining that there has been much discussion over labeling
issues and expressing his feelings that labeling was "likely to happen"). The
phrasing ofSecretary Glickman's speech is symptomatic ofthe United States desire
to avoid trade and domestic implications that are inevitable with labeling
requirements. Although officials feel the inevitability of labeling requirements they
shy away from embracing any policy stricter than voluntary mechanisms. See id.
115 See USDA and Biotechnology: Q and A, supra note 82 (stating that "in
an effort to provide consumers with more information, Secretary Glickman actively
encourages voluntary labeling of biotechnology-derived products").
116 See id. (describing the current United States labeling policy).
11 See Burros, supra note 103 (noting that Secretary Glickman had likened
the regulation of the biotech industry to the regulation of nuclear power twenty
years ago, and urging stricter controls which are in tune with trade goals).
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C. Resolving the Conflict Between the Biotech Industry and the
International Consumer
Secretary Glickman also warned against an "if-you-grow-it-
they-will-come mentality." "s The emphasis on building consumer
acceptance is of paramount importance to United States biotech
companies." 9 Biotech companies have been loath to realize that
global markets do not stand with open arms ready to receive these
miracles of modem science. 20
Instead, genetically modified crops have created a market for
safety.' 2' Widespread resistance to so-called "Frankenstein foods"
predominates the European Union market and places a premium on
proven safety and a well-informed public.122 Rather than creating the
118 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7, at 4 (stating also that the
industry needs to become more accessible to the consumer in an effort to build trust
in their products).
119 See id. at 4. (expressing his belief that consumers and farmers will
eventually come to realize the many benefits of LMOs if only the biotech industry
will place a priority on gaining their acceptance through proven safety). The
Secretary also stressed that corporations need to build consumer confidence in the
same way that airlines and banks build confidence. See id. However, the
Secretary's statements argued for a strong public education effort to be fostered by
both government and private industry. See id. Many have challenged the idea that
consumers can be won over by public perception campaigns, and in Europe,
Monsanto was forced withdraw a public ad campaign designed to dispel consumer
fear over GMOs after it was widely criticized as patronizing. See Todd, supra note
103.
120 See, e.g. Graziano, supra note 3, at 197 (explaining that while the biotech
industry has developed products with the potential to aid in development of third
world countries, these possibilities have yet to be put into practice and arguing that
greater advancement in biotechnology needs to be made before the average
consumer will begin to view LMOs as a viable, worthwhile endeavor).
121 See id. at 197-200 (describing the push toward harmonization of safety
regulations to increase the public's confidence in food imports).
122 See Biotech Needs to Get People on its Side, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 21,
1999, at 27A (stating that measuring biotech's risks and benefits is remarkable
complex, and, as a result, the major biotechnology companies have nothing to gain
from public ignorance); see also Social Responsibility: Bio-engineering/GMOS,
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intended demand for their genetically modified products, biotech
companies have created an alternate market demand for organic
goods; this is a direct result of failure to label their genetically
modified products." If genetically-engineered products are the huge
leap forward which they bill themselves as, the market will accept
them but only if consumers are given an informed choice.'24 In fact,
consumers are extremely interested in products which provide them
with improved capabilities, regardless of their genetic content, but
this is true only when the products involved represent a dramatic
improvement over the naturally-occurring version of the product. 2 s
(last visited Aug. 2, 1999) <http:llwww.altgreen.com.au/sr/bioindex.html>
(discussing the fact that Europeans have dubbed GMO food products "Franken-
foods" and arguing that this term is popular but harmful to a reasoned debate over
the regulation of genetically engineered food products). However, a panel of
doctors in the United Kingdom recently told parliament that too little is known
about the effects of GM foods and therefore, they could not recommend its safety
to human health. See id.; see also Phillip J. Longman, The Curse ofFrankenfood:
Genetically Modified Crops Stir Up Controversy at Home andAbroad, U.S.NEWS
& WORLD RPT., July 26, 1999, at 38 (observing that even reputable journals in
Europe have adopted the term "Frankenfood").
12 See "Certified Organic By" Labeling on Meat and Poultry Products, 64
Fed. Reg. 69 (1999) (labeling guidance) (announcing that the USDA received
approximately 280,000 public comments in response to a call for comment on
organic standards); see also, National Organic Program Proposed Rule: Labeling
and Market Information Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE (press release)
(explaining the Organic rule was promulgated to ensure consumers that food
labeled as organic had met threshold criteria necessary to be labeled as such).
124 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7 (describing the importance
of informed choice, however this statement is made in connection with his
statements urging companies to begin voluntary labeling).
125 See Altered Foods Won'tfHarm Us, infra note 156 (describing, generally,
the markets where genetically modified products have become commercially
successful). But see ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE OECD (June 1999) (noting
that any genetic modification of food is subject to higher scrutiny and a stronger
desire to see the market regulated). Concerns about genetically modified foods
tend to fall into three categories: human health-related concerns, environmental
concerns and ethical concerns. See id.
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It is an absolute imperative, therefore, that LMOs be presented to
consumers without the taint of deceptive marketing implied by a
failure to label the products.
V. Recommendations
The debate over the Biosafety Protocol marks a paradigm shift
taking place in most global economies. 126  The shift to a market
economy demands that governments operate with more transparency
to accommodate the needs of industry.'27 At the same time,
corporations are fiercely protective of their products and processes. 2 '
So there is a natural urge for the biotechnology-based industries to
prompt the United States Government to veto the biosafety
protocol.2 9 This reaction could prove short-sighted, however, if the
global market for safety is not taken into account. 3 ' Product safety
issues have created the market demand for safe food products, and the
negotiation of a Biosafety Protocol should be viewed as rich ground
from which the biotech industry may begin to fulfill this market
demand.' The United States, in its role as the lead exporter of
126 See generally S. Gopikrishna Warrier, supra note 41 (discussing the new
paradigm created by a shift to market economies).
127 See id. at 4.
12 See id. (explaining why this shift to a global market economy requires that
countries reassess their goals and work harder to protect their individual interests).
129 See id. (contrasting the United States goals of protecting their trade
interests with India's need to protect their biological diversity). While United
States interests naturally provoke a policy requiring them to veto the Biosafety
Protocol, India's interests dictate the development of a strong Biosafety Protocol
to protect their main resource - biological diversity. See id.
130 See supra notes 58, 117 and accompanying text.
131 See Biotechnology: UCS's Position,
<http://www.ucsusa.org/agriculture/index.html> (visited Aug. 1, 1999) (expressing
the opinion of the Union of Concerned Scientists on biotechnology and stating that
neither extreme position should dominate the debate over the benefits of
biotechnology). Neither the presumption that biotechnology is beneficial and
necessary nor the position that it is inherently harmful is a useful position and the
Union of Concerned Scientists advocates a regulatory debate which is
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LMOs, has naturally sought to facilitate the free trade goals of the
biotech industry.'32 The current market requires a more sophisticated
understanding of ways these goals will be achieved.'
A. Accepting a Meaningful Leadership Role Under the
Convention on Biological Diversity
The Biotechnology industry continues to produce genetically-
engineered crops, produce and pharmaceuticals at a rapid pace.'34
International policymakers admit to the inadequacies of the current
regulatory framework. 35 The Protocol on Biosafety was an attempt
to provide at least some minimum set of guidelines to protect
countries from the potentially harmful affects of the modem
applications of biotechnology. Unfortunately, the United States' role
in negotiating the Draft Protocol has led the international community
to conclude that the United States is only interested in protecting its
trade interests.'36 However, rather than protecting it's trade interests
in the European market, United States objection to the labeling
nonpolarized. See id.; see also Guarding the Green Choice: Environmental
Labeling and the Rights of Green Consumers, National Wildlife Federation and
Environment Report, Washington, D.C., (1996) at 4-5 (copy on file with The
Environmental Lawyer) (noting that some companies view the labeling process as
a marketing tool and welcome the opportunity to designate their products as
genetically enhanced). Companies who view labels as a marketing tool generally
seek to improve consumer awareness of the technology and its benefits for the
environment. See id.
132 See supra notes 18, 64 and accompanying text.
133 See S. Gopikrishna Warrier, supra note 41 (arguing that societies bring
many interests to the trade negotiating table and that it is necessary for other
countries to have a full understanding of these externalities to effectively protect
their own trade resources).
134 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
135 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7 (calling for independent
review of biotechnology via a newly created review commission and
acknowledging the fact that developers of bioengineered products are outpacing the
regulation of the field).
136 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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provisions under Article 15 of the Draft Biosafety Protocol has
caused significant damage to the United States credibility as a world
leader in biotechnology. 3 7 No single provision under the Draft
Biosafety Protocol has garnered so much popular support as the
requirements on labeling and documentation of LMOs.'38
Furthermore, it has become clear that the trade implications
for the biotech industry will be severe if the United States cannot find
some way to meet international consumers on common ground. 39
The first step toward avoiding another impasse in future negotiations
over biotechnology regulation is United States ratification of the
Convention on Biological Diversity. Perception is reality in the
European Market, and, as long as the United States is perceived as a
behind-the-scenes negotiator, the development of a favorable
137 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that the
stalemate over trade in LMOs has "the potential of creating a very serious trade
confrontation between the United States and the European Union"). But see
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODERN
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE OECD (June 1999) (noting the varying attitudes among
OECD countries with respect to genetic modification and emphasizing the fact that
companies trade interests can be affected differently by national standards).
Although transparent trade standards facillitate trade, they can be a barrier to other
countries trying to enter the market. These national standards also inhibit
international competitiveness and distort the markets. See id.
138 See, e.g. Anita Manning, AlteredFloorMight Mutate Trade, USA TODAY,
Jul. 14, 1999, at A7 (noting that protestors in Europe had torn up test plots for
genetically modified crops); see also Greenpeace International Genetic Engineering
Campaign Home Page, <http://www.greenpeace.org/-geneng/main.html> (last
visited Aug. 2, 1999) (claiming that Unilever UK, the United Kingdom's largest
food manufacturing company, announced that it would be removing all genetically
modified foods from its production line in an effort to meet growing customer
demands for GMO-free foods). Greenpeace official, Benny Haerlin, is also quoted
as saying that "[t]his is the beginning of the end of major transnational food
corporations standing side-by-side with Monsanto." See id.
139 See Greenpeace International Genetic Engineering Campaign Home Page,
supra note 130; see also Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 129 (saying that
"[t]his has the potential of creating a very serious trade confrontation between the
United States and the European Union").
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Biosafety Protocol is unlikely. 40 The United States biotech industry
is aware of this troubling perception and has been a surprising
advocate for United States ratification of the CBD. 4' Ratification of
the CBD will place the United States in its rightful position as a
recognized leader in negotiations on issues of biotechnology.'42 This
will help to also dispel popular concern over the United States'
observer status, and it will give the United States leverage to take a
stronger position in determining other areas of the Protocol.
43
B. Development of a Comprehensive U.S. Labeling System
In addition, if the United States continues to venerate its own
internal regulatory system for genetically modified goods as an
example of transparency and credibility, it must be prepared to
140 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
141 See Lambrecht, supra note 73 (explaining that Monsanto and other
biotech companies will be profoundly affected by the Biosafety Protocol and are
eager for the United States to have an official vote at the negotiating table).
142 See id. (explaining official impact which the United States lacks in its
dealings with other member countries of the CBD).
143 See Redick, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that, regardless of the United
States position as an observer to the CBD, it will still play an important role
because of it's position as the world leader in the biotech industry). However,
Redick argues that during development of a Biosafety Protocol, the biotech
industry has the opportunity to demonstrate that it is capable of working within
existing frameworks to achieve adequate protection of the biodiversity interests at
the heart of the CBD. See id. at 9. This argument is troubling in light of the
corporate resistance to voluntary labeling guidelines advocated by the United
States. See id Redick also contends that voluntary controls provide an "alternative
path" to a Biosafety Protocol. See id; see also David R. Downes, New Diplomacy
for the Biodiversity Trade: Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Intellectual Property
in the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,6
(1993)(arguing that increased global interest in the biotechnology market requires
the United States to take a stronger role in negotiations of the CBD). There is a
new strategy required for protecting resources while also protecting the trade in
biological products, and this strategy should be marked by United States acceptance
of increased responsibility with regard to the negotiation of international
biodiversity treaties like the Kyoto Protocol and the CBD. See id,
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include meaningful labeling requirements within its internal
regulatory system.'" Policymakers must do more than simply urge
companies to voluntarily label their genetically modified goods.'45 As
a leader in the area of biotechnology, the United States has a duty to
develop extensive labeling guidelines which may serve as a model for
other countries lacking in such regulatory experience. 4 6 United
States companies are producing these bioengineered products and
144 See Statement of Stuart Eizenstat, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining the
United States policy viewpoint that the transparency of the United States regulatory
system makes it superior to other systems, such as the United Kingdom, which are
considered to be unpredictable). In his statement, Eizenstat also recognizes the
right of countries to have mandatory food labeling restrictions which it would be
necessary for United States companies to comply with. However, he emphasized
voluntary labeling as a sufficient control. See id. But see S. 1533, 106th Cong
(1999) (requiring France to label its wine exports with'a message reading "Dried
animal blood is occasionally used as a clarifying agent in French wines"). Recent
legislation introduced by Senators Pat Roberts and Max Baucus would require
labeling of French wine exports. See id.; see also Fear of 'Mad Cow' Disease in
French Wine Prompts Introduction of Warning Label Bill, DAILY REPORT FOR
EXECUTIVES, Aug. 13, 1999, atA- 1I (noting thatthe senators stated that the French
"have argued that their consumers need to be warned of all of the 'possible' risks
of foreign-produced food products" so it is only fair that American consumers be
"entitled to the same disclosure of information regarding French products").
145 See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, Biotechnology and Food Safety: Report of a
Joint FAO/WHO Consultation, at 1, Oct. 4, 1996 (concluding that well organized
regulatory controls should be established for biotech products and finding that a
labeling component was necessary to this system).
146 See Redick, supra note 4, at 19-20 (explaining that developing countries
are still struggling to regulate biotechnology but noting that South Africa has taken
steps to implement an information infrastructure to make information regarding
GMOs readily accessible to the public); see also Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
supra note 18, at 25 (expressing concern over the number of developing countries
which sided with the European Union at the negotiations in Cartagefla). In his
statement Stuart Eizenstat noted that, although developing countries potentially
had the most to gain from genetically enhanced crops, they were a surprising ally
with Europe and expressed their desire not to become testing grounds for new
releases of LMOs. See id
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moving them into the market. 47 The United States government,
therefore, cannot fail to accept some level of responsibility for the
regulation of these products.148 United States policymakers have
admitted to the inevitability of labeling laws for LMOs.
149
Considering this admission, the United States would be better served
by leading the way towards labeling rules, rather than waiting for
guidelines to be imposed upon them by their trading partners. 50
C. Understanding the Global Market
Resistance to the development of meaningful international
labeling rules also perpetuates the belief that United States is happier
without regulation because they really are trafficking in products
which are unhealthy or dangerous to the environment.'' For this
147 See Lambrecht, supra note 13 (describing Monsanto's business practice
of redirecting all profits from the sale of GMO products back into further research
and development of genetically engineered food products).
148 See A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection ofBiodiversity: What
Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1993) (explaining that even local
governments have a duty to protect the natural biodiversity of their region and this
duty translates up the ladder to federal and international governments).
149 See Statement of Sec. Glickman, supra note 7 (noting that the concept of
labeling is not "radical" and advocating some informational labeling, but stating
that it is imperative that such labeling initiatives not undermine trade).
150 But see Beach, supra note 95, at 191 (arguing that special labeling
requirements for genetically modified crops are not required because scientific
evidence does not warrant such regulation). However, Dr. Beach's analysis of the
need for labeling is governed by current scientific thinking related to the safety of
LMOs, and it does not include a discussion of consumer acceptance and current
disparities between United States consumers and the market currently being
experienced by the United States' trading partners.
15 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Irresistible Force,
Immovable Object, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 1, 1999, at D14 (stating that
bullying and strong-arming the public are not the way to sell LMOs). Skeptics are
concerned about the business incentives for a few large companies holding the
patents for biotechnology to control much of the world's food supply and
consequently exert undue influence over how safety of that supply is regulated. See
165
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reason, the United States must be willing to accept stricter labeling
standards under the Biosafety Protocol.'52 Recent events in Europe
and the long history of exploitation experienced by developing
countries has created a market for proven safety and informed
choice.'53 International consumers are demanding labeling standards
which allow them the choice between genetically modified products
and those goods which have not had their genetic structure altered in
any way. 54 Although the United States, and the biotechnology
industry in general, may face initial resistance to genetically modified
152 See Redick, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that actions under a Biosafety
Protocol must be market driven and dictated by the societal needs of the member
countries); see also Graziano, supra note 3, at 211 (noting that a "biosafety
protocol would promote a positive, safe image of the [biotech] industry and change
the negative public opinion about biotechnology").
1 See Biotech Needs to Get People on Its Side, supra note 122 (explaining
that developing countries fear that they will become dumping grounds for untested
engineered traits); but see John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and
International Agricultural Trade, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 95 (1997)
(discussing the role of technology and biotechnology and pointing out that
agricultural technology is responsible for increased yields which can prove
significant to developing countries where arable land in lacking). Increasing the
yield from amble land contributes to the food supply while preserving more land
for diversity purposes. See id. It is this promising side of biotechnology which
advocates point to when advocating freer trade in GMOs and unrestricted transport.
See id
154 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing the degree to which
individual consumers have felt compelled to organize campaigns for the labeling
of genetically modified goods); see also, Greenpeace Policy Concerning the
Labeling and Declaration of Genetically Engineered Food Products, (last visited
Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.greenpeace.org/-comms/97/geneng/policy.html>
(detailing a proposed labeling policy and calling on the European Union to
implement this policy for its citizens). Greenpeace advocates a labeling policy in
which all food products that have been produced, processed, grown or cultivated
under several preconditions have to be marked with a clear and easily visible label.
See id Greenpeace's requirements are fairly strict and require use of a label which
is either a non-removable sticker or a direct imprint on the product itself. See id.
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goods which are labeled as such, this resistance should be viewed as
the growing pains of an industry whose success depends completely
on consumer acceptance. 5'
Scientists as well as regulators point out that the biotech
industry must be able to produce products which have proven value
to consumers.'56 If genetic engineering truly holds the promising
future extolled by the glossy covers of biotech company
prospectuses,"5 7 then labeling of the products will simply enable
consumers to better assess the risks versus the benefits of biotech
products.5 8 The international trade community has expressed its
concerns that biotechnology markets tend to be skewed and inflated
due to the high costs of competition relative to the demand for the
product."5 9 Clear labeling of LMO products allows consumers to
155 See Donella H. Meadows, Poor Monsanto; Monsanto Co.'s Plans for
Using Transgenic Products, WHOLE EARTH, June 22, 1999, at 104 (noting that in
a recent Time Magazine poll, 81 percent of respondents said transgenic foods
should be labeled and 58 percent said they wouldn't buy them if they were labeled).
156 See Altered Foods Won't Harm Us, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1999, at
15, available in, 1999 WL 2849110 (arguing that LMOs are not harmful and do not
require review on a case-by-case basis, but finding that there may be merit to
arguments for labeling). The article also notes that the stigma of labeling would
be more easily overcome if GMOs had more to offer than a "redder tomato." See
id.
157 See Monsanto Co., 1997 Annual Report, cover (explaining that the
explosion of knowledge in the bioengineering field is creating opportunity for
Monsanto "to improve nutrition and health to meet the growth in world demand in
a way that sustains our environment"); see also SCIENCE FOR THE EARTH: CAN
SCIENCE MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE? 214-215 (Tom Wakefield & Martin
Walters eds., 1995) (questioning whether the benefits can ever outweigh the risks
in a technology field where so much has yet to be discovered).
158 See Altered Foods Won't Harm Us, supra note 156 and accompanying
notes.
159 See MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE OECD, supra note 136 (noting
that economic stakes in the biotechnology industry are high and new regulatory
standards are likely to produce further trade disputes which will have to be settled
by international organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the
Uruguay Round which guards against regulatory protectionism).
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make more informed choices which will, in turn, create a consumer




As the law struggles to keep up with technology, and as
scientists admittedly require time to discover the side effects of
bioengineered products, the consumer is preeminently aware that
labeling may be the only way in which they may control their
consumption of LMOs. The United States' failure to adopt
meaningful controls regarding labeling and documentation of LMOs
in Cartagefia has created a blanket mistrust of United States
agricultural exports. The biotech industry and the United States are
better served by negotiation of a meaningful international regulatory
system of labeling and the creation of meaningful internal labeling
controls. Without such a labeling system, the biotech industry could
fail to earn the consumer trust and find itself permanently without a
market for the goods which it has spent billions of dollars to engineer.
160 See Redick, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
